Public Law: State and Local Government by Dakin, Melvin G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 35 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-1974 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1975
Public Law: State and Local Government
Melvin G. Dakin
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Melvin G. Dakin, Public Law: State and Local Government, 35 La. L. Rev. (1975)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol35/iss2/23
1975] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1973-1974 425
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Melvin G. Dakin*
AMENDMENT AND REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitutional Convention which drafted the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 was expectably beset with controversy through-
out the year during which the drafting process was going on. A final
assault was made on it in our supreme court just prior to the election
at which the constitution was adopted. The attack, in Bates v.
Edwards,I centered on the convention call and on the composition of
the convention; both attacks were easily rejected by the court.
Though the Constitution of 1921 makes no provision for convening a
convention and speaks only of amendments, the court found that the
legislative power contained therein includes the power to call a con-
stitutional convention.2 Research of the court indicated that past
constitutional procedures have included submitting the call to the
people and thereafter promulgating a constitution without further
reference to the electorate, or calling the convention by edict of the
legislature and thereafter submitting the draft constitution to the
electorate for approval; in one instance, there was submission of both
the call and the proposed constitution to the electorate.3 The 1974
procedure was thus found supported by precedent and was approved
by the court.
The second attack, which was on the composition of the conven-
tion, centered on the argument that with some delegates being ap-
pointed by the governor and some elected, there was a violation of
the equal protection clause of the federal constitution, specifically the
"one man one vote" principle.' The court, however, concluded that
drafting a proposed constitution was not a legislative function but
only a proposing function and hence not violative of the principle. It
was also noted that elected members of the convention had been
chosen from properly apportioned districts and that "the existence of
appointed delegates did not 'dilute' the power of the vote of any given
citizen of the state."5 Finally it was determined that the constitution
of the convention did not violate the original act of Congress pursuant
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 294 So. 2d 532 (La. 1974).
2. Id. at 534. The amending procedure was found not applicable to formation of
a new constitution since application would entail submission of a new constitution as
amendments to the old, a result obviously not intended by its draftsmen.
3. Id. at 539-41.
4. Id. at 538.
5. Id.
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to which Louisiana was admitted to the Union despite the fact that
the enabling act provided for a constitutional convention at which all
members were to be elected; the enabling act was deemed superseded
by the adoption of the first state constitution and its approval by
Congress.'
In 1968, Louisiana took a first step toward coordination in higher
education by adopting an amendment to the education article of the
Louisiana constitution providing for a Louisiana Coordinating Coun-
cil for Higher Education. However, included in the amendment was
a statement that, except for the guidance of the Council, Louisiana
State University was to remain "under the direction, control, supervi-
sion and management of the present Board of Supervisors."7 In 1972
the legislature, not satisfied with the progress of coordination under
the Council, adopted legislation providing for a new Board of Regents
which would replace the existing Board of Supervisors and State
Board of Education.' It was viewed as legislation permitted by Article
III, § 32 of the 1921 Constitution which authorizes the legislature to
merge or consolidate state offices, boards or commissions. In Roy v.
Edwards,' the Louisiana supreme court held the 1972 legislation un-
constitutional, resting its decision on the ground that the 1968
amendment providing for a Council was the only constitutionally
permitted impingement on the authority and power of the Board of
Supervisors. 0
ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS
The importance of properly promulgating election results was
underscored in Pratt v. Livingston Parish Police Jury." A ward beer
license was refused by the police jury on the ground that the citizens
of the ward had exercised their statutory option and had voted
against alcoholic beverages being sold in the ward. The police jury
contended on judicial review of its denial that the appeal was not
timely since the thirty days provided by statute had long since run
on a ward election held in 1948."2 The results of the election, however,
had never been promulgated by formal resolution or ordinance and
the court held that "[iun the absence of such a resolution or ordi-
6. Id. at 539.
7. La. Const. art. XII, § 7 (1921).
8. LA. R.S. 17:3121-34 (1950).
9. 294 So. 2d 507 (La. 1974).
10. Id. at 510.
11. 278 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
12. LA. R.S. 26:590 (1950).
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nance the period within which to challenge the election does not
toll. 1' 3 On the merits the court found the ward election invalid on the
ground that procedures had not conformed to the statute then in
effect. 1
Platt v. Municipal Democratic Executive Committee5 presented
an interesting mode of compliance with a federal district court deci-
sion holding a state statute providing for "running by divisions" un-
constitutional. Louisiana's Attorney General had suggested reopen-
ing an election already set by divisions in order to provide for "run-
ning at large" in compliance with the federal court holding. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that setting a new election with
a new qualifying period was not permissible under the statute"6 but
that the election was nonetheless valid since candidates had partici-
pated and had by agreement "run at large.""
Suits contesting elections on the basis of voting machine irregu-
larities provided continuing opportunity for court interpretation of
the legislative election framework. In Gaudet v. Democratic Execu-
tive Committee of City of Gretna," the committee had rejected a
protest of election irregularities and certified the winner in a second
primary; on suit for relief, the trial court ordered a third primary. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the trial court solution as in
direct contravention of state law. Nonetheless, the court held that the
committee must provide some method of selection between the con-
testants. 9 A dissenting judge wondered what the committee could
now do in view of the fact that it had already made its decision; 0 at
best, it would seem it could only reconsider, hopefully thus freeing
itself from any irregularities which might subject it to judicial review.
In Garrison v. Conick,' the adequacy of the pleadings alleging elec-
13. 278 So. 2d at 899.
14. Id. at 900. An intervention after judgment by the Commissioner on Alcoholic
Beverage Control was dismissed on the ground that LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1091 provides
for intervention only in a pending action even though such an intervenor might there-
after appeal. Had the intervenor coupled his petition for intervention with a petition
to reopen the judgment on the ground of lack of notice and possession of additional
evidence, it would seem that such intervention should be permitted in the interest of
saving judicial time.
15. 281 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
16. Id. at 478-79, construing LA. R.S. 18:309(A) (1950).
17. Id. at 480. The original qualification to "run by divisions" was said to be a
"declaration of intention" which was "abandoned" and replaced by an election con-
ducted in fact, with the acquiescence of all parties, as an "at large" election.
18. 278 So. 2d 556 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
19. Id. at 559.
20. Id. at 560.
21. 291 So. 2d 778 (La. 1974).
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tion irregularities was upheld although the court ultimately refused
to overturn the election. The plaintiff, Garrison, had alleged a num-
ber of specific irregularities without listing the names of alleged irreg-
ular voters. He had also alleged total votes cast and that the outcome
of the election would be changed by the resolution of irregularities.
Reversing the court of appeal, our supreme court held that the peti-
tion stated a cause of action and that Garrison was entitled to a trial
on the merits." Similarly, in Allen v. Gleason,23 allegation of the
malfunctioning of a voting machine in a specific precinct was pre-
sumably adequate pleading since votes affected would be known.
However, the pleadings were held inadequate because the plaintiff in
Allen failed to allege vote totals for the entire election and had thus
not alleged affirmatively, that the irregularity would have changed
the outcome of the election."4
Annexation proceedings were considered in Stein v. Town of
Lafitte.25 The annexation legislation involved, requiring "twenty-five
percent in value of the property within the area," was held to require
that twenty-five percent of the value of all property on assessment
rolls, including commercial, industrial and public service rolls, must
be represented on the petition.2 6 In Morrison v. City of Pineville,2 7 the
city had failed to obtain data on public service property in the area
to be annexed, contending that opponents to the petition had the
burden of proving valuation. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal held
that when opponents establish that the value of public service prop-
erty is not included in the tally, their burden of proof is met.28 While
the court recognized the presumptive validity of an assessor's certifi-
cate, it held that the certificate in question was "meaningless" be-
cause of a failure to include the public service property.29
In the course of attempting to solve problems of flood control and
urban redevelopment, Monroe city officials initially attempted to
obtain approval of only a portion of the program, with the electorate
rejecting the proposal. Thereafter officials prepared a comprehensive
redevelopment plan which included acquisition of property for flood
control facilities along with other redevelopment programs involving
several areas in the city. The omnibus proposal was approved by the
22. Id. at 781.
23. 293 So. 2d 267 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
24. Id. at 269-70 construing LA. R.S. 18:364(B) (1950).
25. 266 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
26. Id. at 521.
27. 288 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
28. Id. at 707-08.
29. Id. at 708.
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voters and the city officials promptly moved, in Monroe Redevelop-
ment Agency v. Faulk,3 ° to expropriate property necessary to imple-
ment the flood control plan which had been rejected earlier. The
expropriation suit was attacked on the ground that the new agency
was without authority to expropriate property for flood control pur-
poses, that the election adopting the redevelopment plan was defec-
tive in requiring only one vote on multiple unrelated projects and
further, that notice was inadequate." All of the attacks were rejected,
the court taking the view that the omnibus proposal was a "modern
day approach to the solution of modern day urban problems, combin-
ing the use of police power and private enterprise."32 Legislation con-
templating an areawide approach with overall comprehensive plan-
ning for redevelopment of entire areas was said to have been approved
by the United States Supreme Court as within the police power of the
state, given the difficulties of solving urban problems on any piece-
meal basis.33 The fact that authorizing legislation required approval
by the qualified electorate "of each development plan or project" was
said not to preclude approval of an overall plan by the electorate, in
effect authorizing specific projects within the plan to be undertaken
without further electorate approval." Strong dissents were registered
in the court of appeal opinion, the dissenters relying upon Tolson v.
Police Jury,31 an early case in which the Louisiana supreme court
nullified an election on the ground that it permitted a single vote for
or against multiple unrelated projects and hence did not allow a voter
free exercise of his judgment.3 Whether our supreme court will apply
the holding to such modern urban redevelopment proposals as here
involved remains to be seen. 7
OFFICERS AND POWERS
In Snell v. Stein,3" the Louisiana supreme court, in a statement
of reasons for refusing writs, reaffirmed the doctrine of immunity of
the sovereign from suit "when acting in the performance of a govern-
30. 287 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
31. Id. at 580.
32. Id. at 583.
33. Id., citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
34. The court relied upon the disjunctive use of "plan or project" in the statute.
Id. at 584.
35. 119 La. 215, 43 So. 1011 (1907).
36. Id. at 223, 43 So. at 1014.
37. Monroe Redevelopment Agency v. Faulk, 287 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1973), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 900 (La. 1974).
38. 201 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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mental function."3 The decision was invoked in Pettis v. State De-
partment of Hospitals"0 in an attempt to narrow the authority of a
legislative waiver of suit to suits for active negligence only, excluding
suits for passive negligence. That distinction was rejected by the
court and Snell was interpreted to hold only that an "agent of the
state is immune from liability for torts committed by him in the
performance of his duties, provided that he was performing a govern-
mental function at the time the tort was committed, and he was
acting within the scope of his authority and in good faith at that
time."" In Pettis, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal found that the
operation of a hospital was not a government function but proprietary
in character and that in any event evidence would be admissible to
show that the doctors acted outside the scope of their authority or in
bad faith."2 A concurring judge was of the opinion that the majority's
interpretation of the Snell case was overbroad and that immunity for
officials discharging governmental functions should be limited to
those duties involving discretion. 3
In the interest of preventing unwarranted intrusions into local
affairs by state police, the legislature provided that state police shall
not act within the limits of any incorporated municipality which
maintains a police force except upon invitation by local officials to
''assist . . .in the investigation of the circumstances of any crime
and in the identification, apprehension, and conviction of the perpe-
trators thereof."" The language conveys the impression that invita-
tions may be extended only when offenses have been completed and
the state police are invited to give assistance in the investigation
thereof. However, in State v. Swain,5 the Louisiana supreme court
held that the statute is broad enough to permit requests to the state
police to issue citations to traffic offenders who commit hazardous
moving vehicle violations within the city limits, and even extends to
arrest of violators if circumstances warrant, as in the case of a charge
39. 251 La. 35, 202 So. 2d 652 (1967).
40. 281 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 887.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 888 (Culpepper, J., concurring). Rather anomalously, the judge cites as
an illustration the case of the police officer held liable for use of excessive force but
who is nonetheless performing a governmental function and acting within the scope of
his authority with good faith. Here liability would seem to be coupled with a use of
discretion, but a use of it which carried the officer beyond the bounds of his scope of
authority, thus within the majority interpretation. See Taylor v. Baton Rouge, 233 So.
2d 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
44. LA. R.S. 40:1391 (1950).
45. 292 So. 2d 495 (La. 1974).
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of driving while intoxicated.46 Home rule over local affairs was
deemed subordinate, however, in B. W. S. Corp. v. Evangeline,47
where it was clear that the legislature had preempted an activity to
the exclusive control of the state. The police jury sought to deal with
a problem of disposition of industrial waste under a legislatively dele-
gated power to regulate disposition of trash, garbage, or "debris of
any kind. 45 The Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that such au-
thority would not support the police jury action where the legislature
has provided by statute for exclusive jurisdiction in the state board
of health over, among other things, "waste disposal within the
state. . .. "" The board was held to have clear pre-empting author-
ity over the regulation of disposal of industrial waste originating in
the state." The Second Circuit Court of Appeal failed to reach an-
other home rule issue in Gifford v. City of Shreveport,5' in which
petitioner alleged that local authority to enact an ordinance requiring
a police escort and imposing a fee therefor upon the owners of oversize
vehicles on the city streets had been pre-empted by the state highway
regulatory legislation. 2 Instead the court found that petitioner had
failed to allege specific facts of injury to him as operator of an escort
service for such vehicles and hence had failed to state a case for
equitable relief.A
The general public policy of the state with respect to Sunday
closing, as specified in a general statute, was held, in National Food
Stores, Inc. v. Cefalu," to preclude local officials from going beyond
such policy by proscribing the operation of grocery stores on Sun-
day. 5 An alternative argument that authority was to be found in a
special legislative grant authorizing municipalities to enact ordi-
nances prohibiting "the desecration of the Sabbath" was rejected, the
court noting that the ordinance could not consistently be upheld on
a desecration basis since it precluded grocery store operation while
allowing operation of other retail businesses, particularly those sell-
ing liquor, an operation which could also be construed to "desecrate
46. Id. at 496.
47. 293 So. 2d 233 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
48. LA. R.S. 33:1236(31) (Supp. 1966).
49. LA. R.S. 40:11 (1950).
50. 293 So. 2d at 237-38. This exclusive control was not weakened by provision
for only "interested party" status for the board in the case of transportation of in-
dustrial waste into the state. LA. R.S. 40:1299.36 (Supp. 1973).
51. 291 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 421.
53. Id. at 421-22.
54. 280 So. 2d 903 (La. 1973).
55. Id. at 906-07, construing LA. R.S. 51:191-94 (1950).
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the Sabbath."5 A dissenter would not have probed beyond the town's
assertion that the ordinance was "to prevent the desecration of the
Sabbath."57
Shortly after prohibition was ended with the adoption of the
twenty-first amendment the Louisiana legislature broadly delegated
authority to effect parish-wide prohibition." Pursuant to this author-
ity Winn Parish enacted an ordinance prohibiting beverages with an
alcoholic content in excess of 1/2 of 1% by volume. Thereafter in 1948
the authority to vote an entire parish dry by local option was deleted
from the act but a saving clause purported to continue existing local
ordinances which might otherwise have been invalidated." The 1950
Revised Statutes, however, repealed this saving clause, substituting
a general clause which in effect saved only the validity of acts already
accomplished; it did not carry forward the operation of otherwise
invalid ordinances and make them applicable to future conduct.6 0
The Winn Parish ordinance sought to be applied in State v. Sissons6 '
was thus found to have been effectively repealed in 1950 and convic-
tion and sentence thereunder were reversed. In Asbell v. Caddo Par-
ish Police Jury,6 2 parishwide regulation, as distinguished from parish-
wide prohibition, was upheld where the regulation took the form of
proscribing liquor sales on Sunday. Attacks on the ordinance as being
prohibitory rather than regulatory, as failing to comply with the state
Sunday closing law and as violating the first amendment of the
United States Constitution by imposing governmental restraints
prompted by religious views, were all rejected by the court of appeal.6
When Emprise Corporation was convicted of conspiracy to vio-
late the Federal Anti-Racketeering Law," an incidental result was
revocation by the Commission on Alcoholic Beverage Control of beer
licenses held by an Emprise subsidiary, Sportservice Corporation.
The licensee sought judicial review in Sportservice Corp. v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety.6" The statute provides for routine revocation
in the event of the conviction of a felony under the laws of the United
56. 280 So. 2d at 908.
57. Id. at 909.
58. La. Acts 1934, No. 15.
59. La. Acts 1948, No. 372.
60. LA. R.S. 26:581-95 (1950).
61. 292 So. 2d 523 (La. 1974).
62. 292 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
63. Id. at 850-51.
64. Emprise Corp., No. 8975 (D. Calif., July 10, 1972) cited in Sportservice Corp.
v. Department of Pub. Safety, 293 So. 2d 530, 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
65. 293 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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States.66 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the revocation
of the permits, however, holding on the basis of encyclopedic juris-
prudence that such conviction must be final before it can be used as
a basis for revocation and that there is not such finality where an
appeal is pending. 7
In Coleman v. Bossier City, 8 city officials entered into agree-
ments with real estate developers to reimburse fifty percent of the
cost of water and sewage facilities in subdivisions without following
prescribed city procedures and without adequate clearance from the
State Bond and Tax Board as to the commitment of future revenues.
There was also no compliance with competitive bidding requirements
of the public contracts law.69 In these circumstances, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the contracts were null but that
developers were nonetheless entitled to recover on an equitable
quantum meruit basis since the contracts were entered into in good
faith and hence deemed malum prohibitum rather than malum in
se.70 Boxwell v. Department of Highways," which was used in
Coleman to sustain recovery on a quantum meruit basis, was again
cited in New Orleans Transfer Co. v. City of New Orleans" to sustain
an injunction against performance by the city on a waste disposal
contract which had not been subjected to public bidding.73 While the
contract involved a new and unique approach to garbage disposal and
involved utilization of a research organization to experiment with
resource recovery, the arrangement for the "collection, treatment and
disposition of garbage" was made with a regular business corporation
and involved "no unique obligations with the city"74 which would
preclude operation of the statute. Noting that under the Boxwell
holding a contract made in violation of public bidding requirements
66. LA. R.S. 26:279 (1950).
67. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquor § 175 (1947). Cf. LA. R.S. 26:285 providing that
revocation for other "violations" requires only that a permitee has been found guilty
by a trial court. Another Emprise subsidiary had been granted permits to sell beer at
the same location, but in view of its holding, the court felt it unnecessary to probe this
questionable practice. 293 So. 2d at 531.
68. 291 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 412.
70. Id. at 413-14. Interest on the recovery was disallowed on the ground that a
state or its agency cannot be compelled to pay interest on unpaid accounts unless
specific provision is made therefor. Boxwell v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760,
14 So. 2d 627 (1943).
71. 203 La. 760, 14 So. 2d 627 (1943).
72. 284 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 363, citing LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950) as amended by La. Acts 1970, No.
274 § 1, and Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans § 6-307.
74. Id. at 365.
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is wholly illegal and unenforceable and that Louisiana law favors
public and competitive bidding and does not favor negotiation of
contracts, the court granted the injunction prohibiting the city from
performance on the contract."5
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS
The case of Bonvillain v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury"8 exem-
plifies the difficulties of enlarging a lot through purchase of an osten-
sibly unused street from a subdivider, at least where dedication may
already have occurred. Such an acquisition and an attempt to occupy
the property precipitated litigation which resulted in establishing
dedication of the street and the consequent unlawfulness of blockad-
ing it." Undaunted, the acquirer then persuaded the parish to revoke
the dedication without inspection under a legislative grant of author-
ity permitting it to do so "when the roads, streets and alleyways have
been abandoned or are no longer needed for public purposes."" Evi-
dence adduced established that the street was in fact used in render-
ing city and commercial services to the adjoining property and the
court held that the revocation by the police jury was null because not
based on evidence and hence arbitrary and capricious." However,
when a claim for public road or street status is based on implied or
tacit dedication the problems of proof may be more elusive. Thus, in
Chargois v. St. Julien," a claim of dedication was refuted under a
statute providing that roads or streets are public "which have been
or are hereafter kept up, maintained or worked for a period of three
years by authority of any parish governing authority . .. ;"' where
only very meager upkeep was furnished by the parish, such token
maintenance was not deemed sufficient to establish a tacit dedication
to public use of private property.2 On the other hand, in Police Jury
v. Briggs,8" where the parish had furnished culverts, gravel and grader
work over a period of some twelve years, the statutory requirement
was deemed to have been met and implied dedication to have taken
place.8"
75. Id. at 365-67.
76. 288 So. 2d 898 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
77. Id.
78. LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950).
79. 288 So. 2d at 899-900.
80. 280 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
81. LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950).
82. 280 So. 2d at 849.
83. 291 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 474-75.
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The early law was clear as to who would bear the cost when a
public road intersected or was intersected by a railroad. The Public
Service Commission was given authority to require the construction
of a proper crossing whenever there was a crossing of a "public road
already constructed or which may be constructed. ... s1 This au-
thority was exercised under the police power and ability to pay was
presumed in the railroad. Later, when the legislature provided for
construction of a highway network, there was recognition of the fact
that railroad resources might not be inexhaustible and provision was
made that when a highway was to be constructed "the agency con-
structing or causing the construction of the highway shall be responsi-
ble for the construction of an appropriate and adequate crossing and
for its subsequent maintenance.""8 In Southern Pacific Transporta-
tion Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,87 this latter lan-
guage was deemed applicable to construction of a grade crossing by
the city and parish of Lafayette where the road connecting with the
interstate highway, which precipitated need for a crossing, was part
of the parish highway system." Not without dissent, the court con-
cluded that the use by the legislature of the general term "agency"
rather than "department" indicated a legislative intent not to limit
the statute to crossings in the state highway system. On the other
hand, where the crossing is clearly within a municipality, the legisla-
ture has authorized the municipality to require, in the interest of
public safety, the construction of an overpass and to impose one half
of the cost of construction and maintenance upon the railroad. 8 If
there is resistance by the railroad, there must be a hearing before the
Louisiana Public Service Commission and the railroad afforded an
opportunity to be heard in respect thereto.9 In such a hearing, in
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission,"2 the railroad attacked the ordered overpass as unneces-
sary to the interest of public safety, claiming that the scale and
magnitude was arbitrary and unreasonable, and the allocation of cost
resulted in the taking of the railroad's property without due process
and in deprivation of equal protection. The court reviewed the pro-
85. LA. R.S. 45:841 (1950).
86. LA. R.S. 48:382 (1950).
87. 294 So. 2d 480 (La. 1974).
88. Id. at 482.
89. Id. at 483.
90. LA. R.S. 33:3701 (1950).
91. LA. R.S. 45:841 (1950).
92. 290 So. 2d 816 (La. 1974).
93. Id. at 818.
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posal on the merits and found it not unreasonable, rejecting the con-
stitutional attack on the ground that the action was within the police
power of the state.9 4
Where the problem is the simpler one of making improvements
on a street with abutting owners, the abutting front footage is all that
is necessary to be shown to assess the cost of street improvements
thereon, coupled with a square yardage apportionment of sidewalk
cost. 5 In Roman Catholic Church v. City of New Orleans"0 the street
widening improvement took all of the immediately abutting prop-
erty, creating a new abutting owner and the argument was made that
in order to be assessed, a landowner must be an abutting owner at
the time construction was initiated. The argument was rejected on
the ground that the statute is clear authority for "levying a local or
special assessment on each lot or parcel of real estate abutting the
street, road, sidewalk, or alley to be improved. . ... ,17 Nor did it
make any difference that the abutting land was subject to a servitude
in favor of the Sewerage and Water Board. 8
UTILITIES
In the late 1940's it took an order of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to compel Gulf States Utilities to divest itself of the
Baton Rouge Bus Company." For the bus company it has been
largely downhill ever since. When the last private owner appeared
ready to abandon the operation as no longer commercially viable, the
city made arrangements to purchase in order to preserve some sembl-
ance of a public transportation system. To accomplish transfer of
ownership the city agreed to purchase at the minimum appraisal with
the right in the owner to seek a greater amount in litigation. Apprais-
als ranged from $245,000 to $445,000, including both tangibles and
intangibles. In Lanneau v. Capital Transportation Corp.,00 the First
Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed the appraisals and affirmed a trial
court decision of $256,000, including $53,000 for intangibles; the lat-
ter amount was deemed ample for a concern which had shown no-
thing but losses for some time and the maximum which could be
approved. 01 "Going concern value" as an item of intangible value was
94. Id. at 820-21.
95. LA. R.S. 33:3301-06 (1950).
96. 280 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
97. Id. at 386-87.
98. Id. at 387.
99. 12 S.E.C. 41, 72, 46 P.U.R. (N.S.) 68, 99 (1943).
100. 292 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
101. Id. at 825.
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deemed nonexistent since there were no excess profits and in fact no
profits at all to capitalize.' 2 Reconstruction cost new less deprecia-
tion was used to value the tangibles, an approach deemed sufficiently
generous since the owner, absent the city as a buyer, might well have
been faced with closing down and selling his equipment wherever he
could on a dismantled basis.' 3 The court of appeal, on reviewing the
record, found a contractual basis for assessing the cost of expert wit-
nesses to the city rather than to the suing owner as had the trial
court.'0 1
CIVIL SERVICE
Among the procedural precedents for suspension and resignation
of civil service employees is a statement that "if an officer removes
an employee for cause, he cannot rescind the order and accept the
resignation of the employee, and thus make him eligible to reappoint-
ment . . ." and that "one who [has] resigned [is] not permitted,
without exhausting his administrative remedies before the Civil Ser-
vice Commission, to maintain an action to have the court rescind or
cancel his resignation and direct his reinstatement. . .. ,,,05 In
Gibson v. Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board,'°0 an officer
resigned as of a future date in order to accept another position. In the
interim, the officer was suspended from duty after being arrested and
booked on criminal charges. The bill of information against him was
later quashed and charges dismissed, but no further action was taken
by the police department. The officer appealed to the board for rescis-
sion of suspension and reinstatement with back pay; the board, how-
ever, took no action other than to confirm that the officer had re-
signed.' 7 The First Circuit Court of Appeal found no evidence that
the resignation had been voluntarily withdrawn and rejected the ar-
gument that "the resignation once submitted is terminated by opera-
tion of law upon a suspension."'0 0 In these circumstances the court
held that the effect of the suspension was to remove the officer from
employment and to suspend the resignation during the period of dis-
102. Id. at 823.
103. Id. at 821.
104. Id. at 825.
105. 4 E. McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.268f (1968).
106. 289 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
107. Id. at 363.
108. Id. at 365. Where dismissal follows suspension there is no double jeopardy
since suspension is not then a sanction but a part of the procedural protection of the
public interest. See Floyd v. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 283 So. 2d 537 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1973).
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position of charges against him; upon a disposition in his favor sus-
pension was terminated but the voluntary resignation was deemed
restored to operation.'19
Concerted efforts of firemen throughout the state to improve
their economic position has precipitated occasional retaliation. Thus
in Crowley Firemen v. City of Crowley," ° the constitutionality of such
a retaliatory ordinance forbidding "moonlighting" by city firemen
was considered by the Louisiana supreme court. The validity of the
ordinance when examined against the background of the legitimate
demands of firefighting employment was determined to constitute a
"direct infringement upon the right to work. .." and thus held
contrary to substantive due process."' Quoting encyclopedic juris-
prudence the court noted that "the validity of the police regulation
• . .primarily depends on whether in all the existing circumstances
the regulation is reasonable or arbitrary and whether it is really de-
signed to accomplish a purpose properly falling within the scope of
the police power."" 2 In Frey v. Department of Police,"' suspension
from duty for refusal to take a polygraph test was upheld as not
unduly or improperly burdening the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination."' United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
was construed to permit punitive action for failure to answer ques-
tions specifically and necessarily related to official duties and to pro-
scribe only attempts on the part of public authorities to coerce em-
ployees into relinquishing their constitutional rights."5
In order to assure that civil service classification systems will not
be distorted by governing authorities for political or other reasons, the
constitution requires a public hearing prior to abolition of a civil
service classification once it is adopted."6 In Odom v. City of
Minden,"7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal determined that no
public hearing was required where a city abolished only the position
as distinguished from a classification."' The decision seems some-
what subversive of civil service principles, particularly in smaller
systems where positions in a classification are limited.
109. Id.
110. 280 So. 2d 897 (La. 1973).
111. Id. at 901.
112. Id. Three justices would have found the ordinance a reasonable exercise of
the city's legislative authority and hence constitutional.
113. 288 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
114. Id. at 411-12.
115. Uniform Sanitation Men's Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 383 U.S. 493 (1967).
116. La. Const. art. XIV, §§ 15.1-15.8, 13 (1921).
117. 287 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
118. Id. at 662.
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RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
The State Employees Retirement System provides for manda-
tory retirement at age sixty-five with employment to be extended
from year to year only by certificate that superior skills and knowl-
edge make continued employment advantageous to the state."9 In
Martin v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System, 20 an em-
ployee member had reached mandatory retirement age and had been
refused further extension. After applying for retirement benefits he
nonetheless took a new position in a state office, arranging to work
thirty-six hours out of a forty hour week in order to qualify under a
board rule that part-time employment would not affect retirement
benefits. 2' Thereafter the board adopted an additional rule providing
for suspension of benefits if state employment resulted in earnings in
excess of 50% of monthly retirement benefits'2 and suspended bene-
fits to the employee for violation of the new rule. The Louisiana
supreme court held that both board rules violated the legislative
intent that there be compulsory retirement at age sixty-five with no
further state service to be allowed except on proper certification and
authorization. 12 3
In a retirement system where benefits are not wholly based on
years of membership but on years of prior service as well, there is
clear economic advantage in expanding prior service in every way
possible. Thus, while the teacher retirement system seems clearly to
contemplate only full time service as eligible for service credit, there
were nonetheless deviations therefrom, such as the allowance of
teacher credit for part-time employment while enrolled as an educa-
tion student, an allowance based on an opinion obligingly furnished
by the Attorney General.' 24 In 1973 the legislature specifically rede-
fined service so as to exclude any credit for student aid or student
employment in a college or university and in Kidd v. Board of Trus-
tees of Teacher Retirement System, 2 " retiring teachers attacked the
statute mainly on the ground that their interest in such part-time
employment credit had vested prior to the statute and that the ad-
ministrative board was equitably estopped to disallow such credit.
The court of appeal held that no such vesting could have occurred
119. LA. R.S. 42:585 (1950).
120. 280 So. 2d 910 (La. 1973).
121. State Employees Retirement System, Rule 8.17 (1973).
122. Id. Rule 8.24.
123. 280 So. 2d at 913. Nonetheless the legislature has now amended the statute
to permit some part-time service after retirement. See LA. R.S. 42:572 (Supp. 1968).
124. 1972 LA. Op. Arr'y GEN. (May 18, 1972).
125. 294 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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since no such rights were clearly granted under the act before its 1973
amendment. Rather, the court noted the act from its inception con-
templated only full time service by persons whose principal occupa-
tion was that of teacher.," Since the amount of regular compensation
is also crucial in the determination of benefits upon retirement, there
is a substantial economic interest in making sure all amounts pro-
perly includable are counted even though it entails making additional
contributions. In State ex rel Coglaiti v. Board of Trustees of the
Police Pension Fund,'" police officers requested that the court man-
damus the board to accept five percent of compensation received for
mandatory additional time required of police officers. The court held
that such time was not overtime in the sense of being irregular and
at unplanned intervals but regularly required additional time, thus
entitled to be included as part of regular compensation.' 8
If a retirement plan is of a non-actuarial nature the return of
contributions will often be precluded even though the member does
not qualify for retirement benefits, as was the case in New Orleans
and Shreveport prior to 1967.129 In Hoffpauir v. City of Crowley,3"
however, the applicable statute had no provision barring refunds and
the court of appeal held that the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius" was fairly relied upon as a basis for inferring that the legisla-
ture did not intend that such refunds be barred; consequently, the
court allowed their recovery.'"' Trustees will also guard a retirement
system against avoidable disability retirements. Thus in Miller v.
Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund,'32 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal noted that a retirement system "does not purport to be a
second workmen's compensation law" and upheld the trustees in
refusing disability retirement even though the employee had quali-
fied for workmen's compensation disability payments, basing their
decision on the fact that the police officer, while unable to do general
police work, was still capable of performing clerical police work.' 33
126. Id. at 271.
127. 294 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
128. Id. at 559. See also State ex rel. Spann v. Board of Trustees of the Police
Pension Fund, 283 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
129. LA. R.S. 33:2298 (1950).
130. 284 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
131. Id. at 115-16. Systems based on actuarial computation normally allow refund
of contributions to members separating from the system, with or without interest. See,
e.g., LA. R.S. 33:2294.2 (Supp. 1967).
132. 286 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
133. Id. at 790. The court did not, however, exclude the possibility, in a proper
case, of both benefits being payable. Id. at 789-90.
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MISCELLANEOUS AGENCY ACTION
Since a large part of the cost of brucelosis eradication in cattle
herds must be borne by the owner through quarantine and treatment
costs, state veterinarians do not uniformly encounter full cooperation
in restraint of cattle for testing.'34 Thus, in Pearce ex rel Livestock
Sanitary Board v. Pitre,'33 an owner had to be ordered to restrain his
cattle for this purpose and countered by attacking the validity of the
statute. By statute, restraint may be ordered against any person own-
ing or having cattle over eight months of age "in a herd which has
shown evidence of brucelosis infection."' 36 The owner admitted he
owned cattle but argued the Sanitary Board must prove the existence
of a herd and had failed to do so.' The court held that the Sanitary
Board adequately proved its case in establishing that the owner did
in fact run cattle. The statutory language "in a herd" was deemed
intended by the legislature to be applicable where an owner had
multiple herds not all of which would necessarily be subject to re-
straint for brucelosis testing because of the absence of evidence of the
disease in some of them."
Another minor episode in the saga of Schwegman Brothers Giant
Supermarket v. Louisiana Milk Commission'39 resulted in victory for
the commission. Schwegman made a written offer to his customers
to make refunds in the event that the Louisiana Orderly Milk Mar-
keting Act140 should be declared unconstitutional or repealed and the
commission sought an injunction. The commission's request for an
injunction was upheld by the Louisiana supreme court as to refund
offers based on repeal but was denied as to offers "expressly condi-
tioned upon an adjudication of retroactive unconstitutionality of the
act. 9141
134. LA. R.S. 3:2221-32 (1950).
135. 281 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
136. LA. R.S. 3:2221(A) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1966, No. 291 § 1.
137. 281 So. 2d at 802.
138. Id. at 803.
139. 290 So. 2d 312 (La. 1974).
140. LA. R.S. 40:940.1-.23 (Supp. 1958).
141. 290 So. 2d at 315-17.
